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Summary at a glance 
 
We examine whether and how changes in accounting regulations influence acquired in-process 




New accounting standards, namely SFAS 141 and 142, were adopted in 2001. The release of 
these two regulations offers a unique opportunity to explore how managers have changed their 
earnings manipulation behavior by using IPR&D costs. In this study, we examine whether and 
how the amount of IPR&D at the acquisition deals is associated with discretionary accruals, 
which serve as a proxy for earnings management. We use a sample of firms reporting acquired 
IPR&D over the period of 1993 to 2007 with a matched group based on size and industry. Our 
results provide evidence that managers strategically use the IPR&D costs as an income-
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decreasing earnings management tool, and SFAS 141 and 142 effectively reduced the use of 
IPR&D cost to manipulate earnings. Furthermore, we examine the effect of SFAS 141R which 
was adopted in 2008, on earnings management by using IPR&D. We use a sample of firms 
reporting acquired IPR&D at the firm level over the period of 1993 to 2011 with a matched 
group based on size and industry. Results indicate that IPR&D is no longer related to income-
decreasing earnings management after the adoption of SFAS 141R. These findings can help 
accounting regulators determine how to curb the misleading use of IPR&D for earnings 
management purposes.  
 
Classification code 
M41, M48  
 
Author biography  
Junyoup Lee is an assistant professor of Finance at Ulsan National Institute of Science and 
Technology. 
Eunsuh Lee is an assistant professor of Accounting at Ulsan National Institute of Science and 
Technology. 
Kevin Kim is an assistant professor of Accounting at University of Memphis.   







1. INTRODUCTION  
In a September 1998 speech at the New York City Center for Law and Business, SEC 
chairman Arthur Levitt brought attention to practices of earnings management that involve 
abuses of accounting judgment (Slavin and Khan, 2006). One of the abuses that Levitt spoke 
about was in-process research and development (IPR&D) reported by acquiring companies in 
business acquisitions. Levitt noted: “Companies classify an ever-growing portion of the 
acquisition price as ‘in-process’ research and development, so… the amount can be written off in 
a ‘one-time’ charge, removing any future earnings drag.”  
In-Process Research and Development (IPR&D) costs is the value that acquiring firms 
allocate out of the acquisition price to the incomplete research and development projects 
acquired from target firms. Due to the lack of specific guidance, allocating IPR&D cost can be 
subjective and managers’ decisions can be discretionary (Dowdell et al., 2009). Prior to SFAS 
141 and 142 in 2001, managers who wanted to avoid “future earnings drag” could do so by 
allocating more of the acquisition price to IPR&D expense. This cost allocation would reduce 
earnings in the acquisition year because of the one-time expense to IPR&D; however, it would 
ensure less goodwill amortization in subsequent periods and thus improve future earnings. 
In the late 1990s, the SEC and the FASB expressed concern about IPR&D because it is 
often recognized as a major portion of the value of an acquisition (Clem et al., 2004). For 
example, in the acquisition of Ares Software by Adobe Systems in 1996, 95 percent of the 
purchase price was written off as an IPR&D (Clem et al., 2004). The SEC and the FASB agreed 
that the matter needed to be investigated thoroughly (Hall, 2003). In response, the FASB ratified 
SFAS 141 and 142 in 2001 and SFAS 141R in 2007. In June 2001, the FASB issued SFAS 141 
and 142, which eliminated the pooling method and goodwill amortization, respectively. They 
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further required firms to periodically test many intangibles, including goodwill, for impairment. 
The compromise offered by the FASB was that firms would no longer be required to 
systematically amortize goodwill.  Instead, SFAS 142 requires that firms test goodwill for 
impairment at least annually. Therefore, the proportion of acquisition price allocated to IPR&D 
vis-à-vis goodwill will depend on the extent to which managers expect goodwill impairment 
charges in the near future.  After SFAS 141 and 142 became effective in 2001, managers viewed 
IPR&D write-offs and future goodwill impairments as tradeoffs (Slavin and Khan, 2006). As a 
result, managers appear to have managed earnings to avoid two years of large write-offs by 
strategically choosing to either write off the IPR&D at the time of the acquisition or at the time 
of a future impairment, but not both. 
In this study, we investigate how firms have altered their allocation behavior using 
IPR&D costs in order to manage their earnings in response to the release of new accounting 
standards. We examine whether the amount of IPR&D expense allocated following an 
acquisition is significantly associated with discretionary accruals, our proxy for earnings 
management. We hypothesize that the implementation of SFAS 141 and 142 significantly 
changed firms’ incentives to use IPR&D expense to manipulate earnings, particularly because 
SFAS 142 eliminates the long-standing requirement for the periodic amortization of goodwill 
and replaces it with the requirement for regular impairment testing. To find the effect of the 
adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 on earnings management using IPR&D costs at the acquisition 
level, we compare a sample of 457 acquisitions with a significant level of IPR&D to a control 
sample (matched on firm size and industry) of 457 acquisitions without IPR&D over the period 
1993-2007. We find a statistically significant relationship between allocated IPR&D expense and 
income-decreasing earnings management during the sample period. We also find that after the 
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adoption of SFAS 141 and 142, the effect of the IPR&D expenses allocated following an 
acquisition is no longer related to income-decreasing earnings management. This result suggests 
that the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 effectively reduced managers’ earnings manipulating 
behavior using IPR&D costs as intended.   
We substantiate our results by conducting an additional test. Specifically, we examine the 
effect of SFAS 141R on earnings management.2 To find the effect of the adoption of SFAS 141R 
on earnings management using IPR&D costs at the firm level, we compare a sample of 684 firms 
with IPR&D to a control sample (matched on firm size and industry) of firms without IPR&D 
over the period 1993-2011. We find that the relative proportion of total IPR&D at the firm level 
is positively related to income-decreasing earnings management. We also find that after the 
adoption of SFAS 141R, the relative proportion of total IPR&D at the firm level is no longer 
associated with income-decreasing earnings management. This finding provides evidence that 
companies modified their decisions on how to allocate portions of the acquisition price after the 
SFAS 141R standard was adopted. Overall, our results support the FABS’s decision to adopt 
SFAS 141 and 142 in June 2001 and the release of SFAS 141R in December 2007. We believe 
the new accounting standards limit managers’ ability to use IPR&D costs to manipulate earnings 
as FASB intended.  
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature that examines the effect of 
SFAS 141, 142, and 141R. First, one of the main reasons the SEC and the FASB created these 
standards was because they feared firms used IPR&D to manage earnings. The extant literature 
fails to substantiate this concern (e.g., Hsu et al., 2009). However, we use a more direct test of 
earnings management and find significant evidence that firms did indeed use IPR&D to manage 
 
2 SFAS 141R was released in December 2007.  It requires companies to capitalize IPR&D costs as an identifiable 
intangible asset instead of expenses then in the business acquisition year. More information regarding SFAS 141R is 
located at Section 6.  
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earnings. Second, we show that after the issuance of SFAS 141 and 142, firms no longer used 
IPR&D as a tool to manage earnings. This provides support that accounting regulations can curb 
the misleading use of IPR&D for earnings management purposes.  
Our paper should be of interest to standard-setters and fellow researchers. Ours is the first 
paper, to the best of our knowledge, to examine the changes in the three accounting rules (i.e., 
SFAS 141, 142, and 141R) that restrict managers’ earnings management behavior by using 
IPR&D.3 By doing so, this paper makes several contributions. From a methodological 
perspective, our more rigorous estimation method and larger sample size enable us to rely with 
greater assurance on the results. From a policy perspective, our findings are particularly relevant 
to the FASB's intention to limit the use of income-decreasing earnings management by using 
IPR&D. Beatty (2007) argues that standard-setters should pay attention to how managers’ 
behavior changes as a result of changes in accounting standards. Findings in this paper may 
provide insights for standard-setters. The evidence in this study indicates that SFAS 141, 142 and 
141R set the limit on managers’ earnings management behavior by using IPR&D.  
The next section presents the prior literature on IPR&D and earnings management and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 provides a 
description of our sample, basic descriptive statistics, and correlation table. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results. Section 6 presents additional tests on our results. Section 7 concludes the 
study.  
2. PRIOR LITERATURE ON IPR&D AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3 Recent studies examine the effect of changes in accounting regulation. Dowdell and Lim (2015) examine the effect 
of SFAS 141R on the frequency of acquisitions with IPR&D. Beatty and Weber (2006) and Jordan and Clark (2011) 
examine the effect of SFAS 142 on goodwill impairment. Andrews et al. (2009) compare the major differences 
between SFAS 141 and SFAS141R. Unlike this paper, those studies do not comprehensively examine the effect of 
three accounting regulation, such as SFAS 141, 142, and 141R on earnings management by using IPR&D.   
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2.1. Prior Literature on IPR&D and Earnings Management     
Due to the material and subjective nature of IPR&D on assets and earnings, IPR&D can 
be used as a tool to manage earnings. Deng and Lev (1998) find that companies increase their 
earnings an average of 25 percent and return on equity by 37 percent when IPR&D costs are 
expensed rather than capitalized. Dowdell et al. (2009) argue that ensuring proper financial 
reporting of IPR&D write-off continues to be challenging and requires significant judgment, 
suggesting that IPR&D costs can be manipulated in nature. Slavin and Khan (2006) argue that 
“The IPR&D value is then estimated by calculating the present value of expected incremental 
cash flows from the project, using a discount rate reflecting the risk of the research project. 
These complexities make the valuation of IPR&D inherently difficult and subjective (page 63).”  
Dowdell and Press (2004) find that restatements reduce the IPR&D expense on average by 62%, 
and increase pre-tax income by 142%, with a median change of 32%. The United States General 
Accounting Office (2002) reports that IPR&D is one of nine possible reasons for the restatement.  
Hsu et al. (2009), however, find that IPR&D write-off is inconsistent with an earnings 
management hypothesis. There are at least two reasons why our results differ from Hsu et al 
(2009). First, IPR&D research is sensitive to sample size (Dowdell and Lim, 2015) and our 
sample is significantly larger than Hsu et al. (2009).  Specifically, Hsu et al. (2009) limit their 
sample to high-tech and pharmaceutical industries, whereas our sample encompasses a broad 
range of industries including high-tech and pharmaceutical industries. In addition, our sample 
covers a longer time period than Hsu et al. (2009). Specifically, our sample period covers the 
years 1993 to 2007,4  whereas theirs covered the period 1994 to 2004. Due to a larger sample 
size, our study may provide more comprehensive evidence than Hsu et al. (2009).  
 
4 Our sample period for additional tests (Section 6 in this paper) covers the years 1993 to 2011.     
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 Second, the proxy for earnings management in our study is different from the proxy of 
Hsu et al. (2009). They use buy-and-hold returns and changes in ROA and ROE of acquirers 
as proxies of earning management. Instead, we use discretionary accruals to measure earnings 
management, which is a more direct proxy for earnings management. Specifically, we use two 
different types of discretionary accruals: a modified version of the Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995) and performance matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005). By using these 
proxies for earnings management, our study more directly tests the relationship between the 
effect of IPR&D and earnings management.5  
 
2.2. Hypotheses Development   
 In 1998, SEC chairman Arthur Levitt brought attention to practices of earnings 
management that involve abuses of accounting judgment (Springsteel, 1998).6 This speech 
indicates that management has considerable discretion in estimating the variables and 
components used to value IPR&D (Slavin and Khan, 2006). Dowdell et al. (2009) find that some 
acquirees have low R&D costs prior to the acquisition, while the acquirers record high IPR&D 
write-offs subsequent to the acquisition, suggesting that the amount of the IPR&D write-offs 
may have been inappropriate. Their results, however, indicate that the extensive use of IPR&D 
write-offs by acquiring firms as a part of widespread earnings manipulation, as claimed by the 
SEC and anecdotes, may be exaggerated in general.  
 
5 Evidence from prior studies supports the use of discretionary accrual proxies to detect earnings management. For 
example, Ayers et al. (2006) find that the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and earnings 
management are strengthened in those settings where firms have greater incentives to manage earnings. In addition, 
Dechow et al. (2010) articulate that the discretionary accruals isolate the managed component of accruals, and thus 
the use of these discretionary accruals models are the accepted methodology in accounting to capture management 
discretion. 
6 In a September 1998 speech, chairman Levitt stated, “In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and 
project a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful presentation. As a result, I 
fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings and therefore the quality of financial reporting 
(Springsteel, 1998, page 21).”  
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There are several reasons why managers are more likely to use IPR&D expense allocated 
following an acquisition as a tool to decrease income. Historically, IPR&D write-off has been a 
perfect place to record acquisition costs, allowing managers to avoid future net losses as well as 
negative goodwill (Mulford and Yang, 2008). Next, managers could encourage financial analysts 
to discount the IPR&D write-off as a nonrecurring item while at the same time inflate the future 
earnings prospects provided by newly purchased research and development (Mulford and Yang, 
2008). Lastly, by writing-off IPR&D, total shareholder's equity and total assets are lower, 
improving measures of efficiency, such as asset turnover and return on equity (Mulford and 
Yang, 2008).   
For these reasons, we contend that IPR&D is used as a tool to decrease earnings when it 
is necessary. Specifically, we expect that the IPR&D expense allocated following an acquisition 
is associated with income-decreasing earnings management. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
 
H1:  The amount of IPR&D expense allocated following an acquisition is   
              positively related to income-decreasing earnings management.  
 
SFAS 141 and 142 significantly changed the landscape of the regulatory environment 
(Jarva, 2009; Jahmani et al., 2010). We believe these new standards present managers with a 
limited set of options and new incentives that did not exist prior to 2001. In particular, since 
SFAS 142 eliminated goodwill amortization and replaced it with periodic impairment testing, the 
old argument that IPR&D write-offs could alleviate the future drag on profits caused by goodwill 
amortization no longer applied. Unlike amortization expense, goodwill impairment losses are 
likely to occur irregularly and in varying amounts (Jarva, 2009; Chen et al., 2015). These new 
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goodwill impairment rules lead to different predictions regarding how firms would allocate 
acquisition price between IPR&D and goodwill in the post-2001 period (Slavin and Khan, 2006). 
If managers were concerned about current period operating performance, they could have 
attempted to improve the appearance of current earnings by allocating more of the purchase price 
to goodwill (Jordan and Clark, 2011). This would give them more flexibility in determining 
when (if ever) the goodwill impairment will hit the income statement (Watts 2003; Jarva, 2009).7 
Thus, the positive relationship between IPR&D expenses allocated following an acquisition and 
income-decreasing earnings managements would be diminished. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
  
H2: After the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142, the effect of the amount of IPR&D 
expense allocated following an acquisition is no longer related to income- 
decreasing earnings management.  
  
3. RESEARCH DESIGN    
To investigate whether IPR&D at the acquisition level influences earnings management (H1 
and H2), we use following regressions:  
 
 DAit (or P_DA) = β0 + β1× IPRDit + β2 × S141it + β3× IPRDit ×S141it  
                                           + β4×SIZEit + β5×LEVit + β6×NOAit + β7×S_GROWTHit  









Modified Jones discretionary accruals following Dechow et al.(1995);   
Performance matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. 
(2005);   
IPRD = IPR&D ratio measured using IPR&D costs divided by total acquisition 
costs;   
S141 = An indicator variable which takes the value of 0 if a firm-year is prior to the 
SFAS 141 and 142 effective date (June 30, 2001), and 1 otherwise; 
 
7 Watts (2003) argues that the use of estimation and judgment in determining fair value of goodwill and future cash 
flow would provide potential opportunities for earnings management.  
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SIZE = Market capitalization of acquirers one month before the merger and 
acquisition deal; 
LEV = Short-term debt plus long-term debt due in one year, divided by total assets; 
NOA = Net Operating Assets (NOA) following Nissim and Penman (2001);  
S_GROWTH = Current year sales (SALE) less prior year sales, divided by prior year sales; 
BTM = Book to Market; and 
ROA = Return (Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) on 
Assets.  
 
Our research period for research model (1) is from 1993 to 2007. DA is discretionary 
accruals that are measured using modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995). We also use performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals (P_DA) following Kothari et al. (2005). We expect that the 
coefficient on IPRD (β1) is negative to support our first hypothesis. The sum of coefficients β1 
and β3 should be insignificant to support our second hypothesis.  
Several control variables are added to the research model following prior studies. Prior 
studies find that firm size is related to earnings management. Larger firms are more restricted on 
earnings management because large firms are subject to scrutiny by financial analysts, regulators 
and market forces (Lee and Masulis, 2011). Therefore, we control for firm size in our regression 
analysis. Firms with high leverage are more likely to be associated with increasing discretionary 
accruals because they have strong incentives to meet their debt covenants (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). Therefore, we control for leverage on our analysis. Further, we control for 
net operating assets, sales growth, and book to market to be consistent with most of the earnings 
management literature (Cormier et al., 2014).  
 
4. DATA SELECTION     
 To develop the sample for our study we first identify all public companies within 
Compustat North America with IPR&D data from 1993 to 2007.8  Then, we hand-collect the 
 
8 Compustat provides IPR&D data from 1993. Our sample period ends in 2007 because SFAS 141R became 
effective on December 15th, 2008. 
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dollar amounts for each individual acquisition and the allocation of IPR&D data (variable IPRD) 
from the 10-K annual reports.9 After collecting the acquisition price allocations, we obtain 457 
merger and acquisition deals over the 15-year period from 1993 to 2007. We match the 457 
“IPR&D write-off” merger and acquisition deals with 457 “non write-off” mergers and 
acquisitions deals from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Merger & Acquisitions Database 
based on the acquirers’ firm size (market capitalization of acquirers one month before the 
acquisition is announced) and firm industry (3-digit SIC codes) because acquirer’s return around 
the time of merger and acquisition is related to their size (Hsu et al., 2009).10 Our final sample 
size for testing the two hypotheses is 914 (457 test sample plus 457 matched control sample). 
Table 1 contains a summary of the IPR&D sample selection process.   
 To create size and industry matched samples, we do the following. First, we identify 
companies that performed merger and acquisition and allocate IPR&D expenses. We refer to this 
sample as the treatment sample (IPR&D sample in Table 3). Second, we find companies that 
perform merger and acquisitions, but do not allocate any IPR&D expenses from Compustat. 
Each company allocating IPR&D expense is matched with a company with no allocation of 
IPR&D expense in the same three-digit SIC code and closest in market capitalization (Matched 
Control Sample in Table 3). By adopting Roberts and Whited (2012), all matching is conducted 
with replacement.11   
 
9 After obtaining the sample firm names for years 1993 to 2007, we collect their purchase price allocation data, 
including IPR&D, by reading the acquisition footnotes in Form 10-K filings submitted to the SEC by the firms. 
Firms usually disclose detailed information about how they allocated their acquisition prices to IPR&D, goodwill, 
and other intangible assets in their footnotes.  
10 We thank the anonymous reviewer for the comment. We use SDC platinum acquisition data for matching deals. 
SDC platinum do not disclose IPR&D allocation, so we use Compustat annual data to check whether acquirers use 
any IPR&D in the acquisition year.  
11 According to Roberts and Whited (2012), “Matching with replacement allows for better matches and less bias, but 
at the expense of precision...We prefer to match with replacement since the primary objective of most empirical 
corporate finance studies is proper identification. Additionally, many studies have large amounts of data at their 
disposal, suggesting that statistical power is less of a concern” (page 74-75). 
13 
 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 
Table 2 reports the industry distribution of IPR&D sample based on a three-digit standard 
industrial classification. The majority of industries at the acquisition level is electronic and other 
electronic equipment (117 out of 457 frequencies), chemicals and allied products (102 out of 457 
frequencies), computer and data processing services (93 out of 457 frequencies), and instruments 
and related products (77 out of 457 frequencies).  
 [Insert Table 2 here.] 
 
Table 3 reports basic descriptive statistics. The mean values of DA for the IPR&D sample 
and matched control sample are -2.028 and -0.135, respectively. The p-value from a T-test of the 
difference of DA between IPR&D sample and matched control sample shows that the mean 
values are significantly different at the 1% level. This finding is similar to variable P_DA. Our 
main variable of interest, IPRD, is 0.293 in the IPR&D sample, suggesting that on average, in 
each acquisition, acquirers allocate 29 percent of the deal price to IPR&D. Firm size (SIZE) is 
calculated as market capitalization of acquirers one month before the merger and acquisition deal. 
The mean value of firm size for the IPR&D sample is slightly larger (7.161) than that for the 
matched control sample (7.141), but the difference is not statistically significantly different from 
zero. This result follows from using market size as one of the matching criteria.  
 [Insert Table 3 here.] 
 
Table 4 shows a correlation matrix among variables used in the analysis of the IPR&D 
sample at the acquisition level. IPRD is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with 
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S141, suggesting that the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 is significantly correlated with 
decreasing IPR&D expenses.  
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
 
We use a difference-in-differences (DID) design to test whether there are significant 
changes in discretionary accruals for the IPR&D sample group relative to the matched control 
sample group after the regulation of SFAS 141 and 142 are introduced. Table 5 shows that 
IPR&D sample group has a higher proportion of discretionary accruals compared with the 
matched control sample group. We aggregate the observations into pre-SFAS 141 and 142 and 
post-141 and 142 windows. Results from Table 5 indicate that the IPR&D sample group seems 
to be engaged in earnings management significantly more than the matched control sample group 
in both the pre-event window and the post-event window. However, the difference of DA 
between the IPR&D sample group and matched control sample group becomes insignificant after 
SFAS 141 and 142 are introduced. That is, we find no difference in earnings management for the 
IPR&D sample groups relative to the matched control sample group after the regulations are 
imposed. This result remains unchanged when we use performance based discretionary accruals 
(P_DA). Overall, these results support our view that SFAS 141 and 142 effectively reduced the 
use of IPR&D cost to manipulate earnings.  
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS      
5.1. Effect of IPR&D Allocation on Earnings Management  
In this section, we test our first hypothesis. We use two model specifications using two 
different measures (DA and P_DA) of earnings management concerning the effect of the amount 
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of IPR&D allocated following an acquisition on earnings management (DA and P_DA).  
Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the coefficient estimates and p-values from research model (1), 
where the matched sample is the industry and size control group. Results are presented in Table 
6. The dependent variable of the first two columns in Table 6 is discretionary accruals measured 
by modified Jones (DA) and the dependent variable of the next two columns is performance 
matched discretionary accruals (P_DA). The coefficients on IPRD are negative and statistically 
significant under all model specifications, suggesting that IPR&D allocation is positively related 
to income-decreasing discretionary accruals.  
Next, we add control variables SIZE, LEV, NOA, S_GROWTH, BTM, and ROA in 
Column (2). Both highly leveraged firms and more profitable firms are more likely to increase 
their discretionary accruals, resulting in upward earnings management. When the residuals are 
correlated across observations, OLS standard errors can be biased and either over or 
underestimate the true variability of the coefficient estimates. Petersen (2009) shows the correct 
method to estimate standard errors. Following his paper, we also adjust standard errors clustered 
by firm and year in Column (2).  Our results remain significantly negative after adjusting for 
firm and time effect. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation (0.270, 27%)  
increase in the IPR&D ratio implies a 63% (= -2.335 multiplied by 0.270) increase in income-
decreasing earnings management based on Column (2). These illustrations suggest that the 
magnitude of IPR&D’s impact on earnings management is economically meaningful. Another 
way to analyze the effect of IPR&D is to compare the relative influence of firm size and IPR&D 
cost. A one-standard-deviation (1.821) increase in size is associated with an income-decreasing 
earnings management increase of 94% (= -0.515*1.821). Thus, the IPR&D cost is substantially 
influential for earnings management. This result supports Hypothesis 1 and provides evidence of 
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managers’ “big-bath” earnings management behavior by expensing an excessive amount of 
IPR&D cost prior to the adoption of SFAS141 and 142. Overall, results from Table 6 support 
SEC’s concerns about the possibility that IPR&D could distort financial results (Levitt, 1998).  
The signs of the control variables are consistent with prior studies. Specifically, the 
coefficients on SIZE are negative and statistically significant, consistent with findings of Lee and 
Masulis (2011). The coefficients on leverage (LEV) are positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with findings of Morsfield and Tan (2006). In Panel B, we find similar results using 
performance adjusted discretionary accruals (P_DA) as a proxy of earnings management. Again, 
the coefficient on IPRD is significantly associated with income-decreasing earnings 
management, supporting our first hypothesis.   
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
 
5.2. Effect of the Adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 on Earnings Management  
 
 In this section, we test whether the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 affected managers’ 
earnings management behavior on IPR&D expenses allocated following an acquisition. We use 
two model specifications using two different measures (DA and P_DA) of earnings management 
concerning the effect of adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 on IPR&D allocation following an 
acquisition. Results are presented in Table 7. The dependent variable of the first two columns in 
Table 7 is discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones (DA) and the dependent variable of 
the last two columns is performance matched discretionary accruals (P_DA). Columns 1, 2, 3 
and 4 report the coefficient estimates and p-values from estimating research model (1), where the 
matched sample is the industry and size control group. 
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 To examine the total effect of the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 on earnings 
management, we perform a joint (sum) test of IPRD and the interaction term of IPRD and 
S141.12  In Table 7, the results of the joint test of IPRD and the interaction terms of IPRD and 
S141 are not statistically significant (the test of β1 + β3 = 0, fail to reject H2). This result suggests 
that after the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142, the amount IPR&D expense allocated following an 
acquisition is no longer related to income-decreasing earnings management. We also find similar 
results in Panel B using performance adjusted discretionary accruals, suggesting that our results 
are not driven by different measurement of discretionary accruals.  
 Consistent with results in Table 6, we find that the coefficient on IPRD is negative and 
statistically significant in column 1, 2, 3, and 4. This result suggests that the amounts of IPR&D 
expenses allocated following an acquisition is positively related to income-decreasing earnings 
management, supporting our first hypothesis. In addition, our results from joint test provide 
evidence that SFAS 141 and 142 succeeded in lowering income-decreasing earnings 
management.  
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
6. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
There is one additional new accounting standard that may have influenced the effect of 
IPR&D on earnings management: SFAS 141R. In December 2007, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) released SFAS 141R, which requires firms to recognize acquired 
IPR&D as an identifiable intangible asset. The provisions of SFAS 141R became effective 
beginning December 15, 2008. According to SFAS 141R, “Research and development assets 
acquired in a business combination [are] to be recognized regardless of whether they have an 
 
12Following Cormier et al. (2014), we conduct a joint (sum) test of IPRD and the interaction term of IPRD and S141.   
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alternative future use.”13 Specifically, IPR&D “shall be considered indefinite lived until the 
completion or abandonment of the associated research and development efforts. During the 
period those assets are considered indefinite lived they shall not be amortized but shall be tested 
for impairment.”14 If the IPR&D is abandoned, the capitalized costs are written off (Mulford and 
Yang, 2008). In other words, SFAS 141R requires IPR&D costs to be measured at fair value, 
capitalized, and annually tested for impairment (Andrews et al., 2009).   
In this section, we examine the effect of SFAS 141R on earnings management by using 
IPR&D costs. We develop the following research model for testing.  
 
DAit (or P_DA) = β0 + β1× FIRM_IPRDit + β2 × S141Rit +β3× FIRM_IPRDit ×S141Rit 
   + β4×SIZEit + β5×LEVit + β6×NOAit +β7×S_GROWTHit + β8×BTMit + β9×ROAit + εit   (2) 




FIRM_IPRD = IPR&D at the firm level measured using IPR&D expenses divided by 
sales revenues; and 
S141R = An indicator variable which takes the value of 0 if a firm-year is prior 
to the SFAS 141R effective date (December 15th, 2008), and 1 
otherwise.  
Other control variables are as defined in model (1). 
 
 
All variables except for FIRM_IPRD and SFAS141R are the same as research model (1) 
above. Our research period for regression model (2) is from 1993 to 2011. We expect that the 
coefficient β1 is negative so that the relative proportion of total IPR&D at the firm level is 
positively related to income-decreasing earnings management. Also, we expect that the sum of 
coefficients β1 and β3 is insignificant so that the effect of the relative proportion of total IPR&D at 
 
13 SFAS No. 141 (R), Businesses Combinations (Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Standard Board, December 
2007), page 130, paragraph B150.    
14 SFAS No. 141 (R), Businesses Combinations (Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Standard Board, December 
2007), page 261, paragraph h.   
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the firm level is not related to income-decreasing earnings management after the adoption of 
SFAS 141R. This result would suggest that the adoption of SFAS 141R mitigates income-
decreasing earnings management via IPR&D allocation. We use the same control variables used 
in research model (1).   
In research model (2), we use the total dollar amounts of IPR&D (variable FIRM_IPRD) 
because a firm may have multiple acquisitions per year. According to Fuller et al. (2002), 
economically significant takeover activities involve multiple acquisitions instead of purchasing 
just one firm. For example, 24 petroleum and natural gas acquirers purchased 119 target firms 
(accounting for 72.8% of bids in the own industry) within three years during the period 1990 to 
2000. Due to the significance of a firm's multiple acquisitions, we examine the effect of the 
relative proportion of total IPR&D at the firm level on earnings management in this section.  
The total dollar amounts of IPR&D (variable FIRM_IPRD) can be found in Compustat. 
We obtain detailed data for 684 acquisitions at the firm level over the 19-year period from 1993 
to 2011. We obtain our data on merger and acquisitions from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions Database. We match the IPR&D “write-off” with other “non 
write-off” mergers and acquisitions at the firm level based on the industry (3-digit SIC codes) 
and acquirers’ size (market capitalization of acquirers one month before the deals) following Hsu 
et al. (2009). The final sample for our additional test is 1,368, including 684 merger and 
acquisitions with subsequent firm level’s IPR&D write-offs and 684 matched non write-offs.   
 We use two model specifications using two different measures (DA and P_DA) of 
earnings management.  Results are presented in Table 8. The dependent variable in the first two 
columns in Table 8 is discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones (DA) and the 
dependent variable in the last two columns is performance matched discretionary accruals 
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(P_DA). Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the coefficient estimates and p-values from estimating 
research model (2), where the matched sample is the industry and size control group. 
 The coefficients for FIRM_IPRD using discretionary accruals (DA) as the dependent 
variable are negative and statistically significant in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that IPR&D 
at the firm level is positively associated with income-decreasing earnings management. The 
results using performance adjusted discretionary accruals (P_DA) as the dependent variable in 
columns (3) and (4) are similar. 
 Overall, our results indicate that both IPR&D at the acquisition and firm levels are 
positively related to income-decreasing earnings management. Considering that the acquiring-
firm's managers have to make several judgments to value IPR&D during an acquisition (Slavin 
and Khan, 2006), our results indicate that managers use IPR&D as a tool to manage earnings 
downward.  
 [Insert Table 8 here.] 
 
 Next, we examine the effects of SFAS 141R adoption on the association between IPR&D 
at the firm level and income-decreasing earnings management. Results are presented in Table 9. 
Similar to Tables 6 through 8, the dependent variable in the first two columns in Table 9 is 
discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones (DA) and in the last two columns is 
performance matched discretionary accruals (P_DA). To test the effect of SFAS 141R, we use a 
S141R dummy variable, equal to 1 if after adoption of SFAS 141R, and otherwise 0. Our 
variable of interest is the sum of the FIRM_IPRD variable and the interaction term of 
FIRM_IPRD and S141R. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the coefficient estimates and p-values 
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from estimating research model (2), where the matched sample is the industry and size control 
group. 
         To examine the total effect of adoption of SFAS 141R on earnings management by using 
IPR&D, we perform a joint test of FIRM_IPRD and the interaction term of FIRM_IPRD and 
S141R. We find that the coefficient of the joint test is not statistically significant (the test of β1 + 
β3 = 0). This result suggests that after the adoption of SFAS141R, the effect of the relative 
proportion of total IPR&D at the firm level is not related to income-decreasing earnings 
management. This result also implies that the adoption of SFAS 141R is effective in mitigating 
income-decreasing earnings management. When SFAS 141R becomes effective, IPR&D should 
be capitalized as indefinite-life intangible assets (Dowdell and Lim, 2015). Prior to SFAS 141R, 
managers have strong incentive to allocate more purchase price to IPR&D and less to goodwill 
and other intangible assets (Dowdell and Lim, 2015). However, with SFAS 141R, managers do 
not have strong incentives to allocate more of the purchase price to IPR&D (Dowdell and Lim, 
2015), suggesting that SFAS 141R somewhat mitigates the manager’s incentive to manage 
earnings by using IPR&D. 
 [Insert Table 9 here.] 
7. CONCLUSION  
IPR&D is defined as the value allocated to incomplete research and development projects 
in business combinations and asset purchases (Dowdell and Lim, 2015). In June 2001, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) issued SFAS 141, Accounting for Business 
Combinations and SFAS 142, Accounting for Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets. The release 
of new accounting standards offered a unique and rare opportunity to investigate how managers 
altered their earnings management behaviors over time as the regulatory environment changed. 
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In this study, we examine the association between IPR&D allocation and discretionary accruals, 
a proxy for earnings management, to explore how managers changed their earnings management 
behavior through the allocation of IPR&D write-off in response to the issuance of new IPR&D 
accounting standards. 
Our results provide consistent evidence that managers have strategically modified the use 
of IPR&D as an earnings management tool as the regulatory environment changed. We find that 
before the adoption of SFAS141 and 142, the amount of IPR&D expense allocated following an 
acquisition is positively related to income-decreasing earnings management. In addition, we find 
that after the adoption of SFAS141 and 142, the effect of the amount of IPR&D expense 
allocated following an acquisition on income-decreasing earnings management is removed. 
Results from our additional test show similar results at the firm level. These results support 
FASB’s decision to release SFAS 141R, which mandated firms to capitalize IPR&D as an 
intangible asset.  
Our study extends Hsu et al. (2009) by using a larger sample, more direct measurement 
of earnings management, and a more rigorous method. Our finding that managers’ earnings 
management behavior changes when new accounting standards, such as SFAS 141, 142, and 
141R are adopted is consistent with an earnings management hypothesis.     
According to Beatty (2007) and Dowdell and Lim (2015), standard-setters should pay 
attention to changes in managers’ behavior as a result of changes in accounting standards. Our 
study addresses those concerns by answering the question of whether IPR&D costs are 
associated with earnings management and how new accounting standards can influence IPR&D. 
This study has implications for accounting regulators and companies outside the U.S. GAAP 
umbrella. We find evidence that managers strategically use the IPR&D costs as an income-
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decreasing earnings management tool. Furthermore, our findings indicate that SFAS 141, 142, 
and SFAS 141R effectively reduced the use of IPR&D costs to manipulate earnings. These 
findings can help international accounting regulators determine how to curb the misleading use 
of IPR&D for earnings management purposes and help companies with their accounting for 
IPR&D acquisitions. We leave the investigation of the long-term consequences of SFAS 141, 
142, and 141R adoption, including the managers’ earnings management behavior by using 




APPENDIX: Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables    
DA = Modified Jones discretionary accruals following Dechow et al. (1995).    
P_DA = Performance matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. 
(2005).  
 
Independent Variables   
IPRD = IPR&D ratio measured using IPR&D costs divided by total acquisition 
costs.  
FIRM_IPRD = IPR&D at the firm level measured using IPR&D expenses divided by 
sales revenues. 
S141 = An indicator variable which takes the value of 0 if a firm-year is prior to 
SFAS 141 and 142 effective date (June 30, 2001), and 1 otherwise. 
S141R = An indicator variable which takes the value of 0 if a firm-year is prior to 
SFAS 141R effective date (December 15th, 2008), and 1 otherwise. 
 
Control Variables  
SIZE = Market capitalization of acquirers one month before the merger and 
acquisition deal. 
LEV = Short-term debt plus long-term debt due in one year, divided by total 
assets. 
NOA = Net operating assets (NOA) following Nissim and Penman (2001) 
net financial obligations (NFO) + common equity (CSE) + minority 
interest (MI), where: 
 
NFO = Financial Obligations (FO) - Financial Assets (FA) 
FO = debit in current liabilities (DLC) + total long-term debt (DLTT) + 
preferred stock (PSTK) – preferred stock in treasury (TSTKP) + preferred 
dividends in arrears (DVPA) 
FA = cash and short-term investments (CHE) + other investments and 
advances (IVAO) 
CSE = common equity (CEQ) + preferred stock in treasury (TSTKP) – 
preferred dividends in arrears (DVPA) 
MI = minority interest (MIB) 
 
S_GROWTH  = Current year sales (SALE) less prior year sales, divided by prior year 
sales. 
BTM = Book to market.  
ROA = Returns (Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) 
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Table 1: Construction of IPR&D Sample   
 
 
 No. of Obs 
Individual acquisition IPR&D data (10-K footnote) 589 
Less: key variables are missing 27 
Less: outliers (when IPR&D ratio is greater than 1) 89 
Less: lack of matching firms 16 
Final sample of individual acquisition IPR&D data 457 
This table reports the IPR&D sample selection process. To develop the IPR&D sample, we first identify all public 
companies within Compustat North America with IPR&D data from 1993 to 2007. Then, we hand-collect the dollar 
amounts for each individual acquisition and the allocation of IPR&D data from the 10-K annual report. This 
produces 589 potential firm-year observations. After eliminating observations that have missing regression variables 
and those that are outliers, we obtain 473 observations. Then, we match the “IPR&D write-off” merger and 
acquisition deals with “non IPR&D write-off” mergers and acquisitions deals using Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Merger & Acquisitions Database based on the acquirers' firm size and industry. Our final sample size for 
testing the two hypotheses is 914 (457 test sample plus 457 matched control sample) over the 15-year period from 








 Agricultural production 3 
 Oil and gas field services 3 
 Chemicals and allied products 102 
 Rubber & misc. plastics products 1 
 Industrial machinery & equipment 45 
 Electronic & other electric equipment 117 
 Instruments & related products 77 
 Wholesale trade-durable goods 1 
 Miscellaneous retail 1 
 Security and commodity brokers 1 
 Real estate operations and lessors 1 
 Holding & other investment offices 3 
 Personal services 2 
 Computer and data processing services 93 
 Engineering & management services 7 
Total sample  457 
The overall sample consists of 457 firm-years over the period 1993–2007. This table reports industry distribution 




Table 3: Basic Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 IPR&D Sample  Matched Control Sample      
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.  N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.  Mean Diff. p-values 
DA 457 -2.028  10.666  -32.357  -1.152  30.898   457 -0.135  8.657  -32.357  -0.321  30.898   -1.893 *** (0.003) 
P_DA 457 -2.170  10.415  -31.230  -1.402  28.035   457 -0.258  8.574  -31.230  -0.349  30.499   -1.912 *** (0.003) 
IPRD 457 0.293  0.270  0.000  0.186  0.900    457 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.293 *** (0.000) 
S141 457 0.700  0.459  0.000  1.000  1.000    457 0.700  0.459  0.000  1.000  1.000   0.000  (1.000) 
SIZE 457 7.161  1.821  3.478  7.079  12.222    457 7.141  1.916  1.325  7.146  12.215   0.020  (0.868) 
LEV 457 0.132  0.169  0.000  0.036  0.602    457 0.131  0.159  0.000  0.062  0.728   0.000  (0.889) 
NOA 457 0.792  0.918  -0.187  0.571  6.571    457 0.483  0.328  -0.780  0.473  1.908   0.309 *** (0.000) 
S_GROWTH 457 0.421  0.767  -0.717  0.246  4.600    457 0.210  0.536  -1.000  0.118  4.822   0.210 *** (0.000) 
BTM 457 0.390  0.304  0.038  0.303  1.593    457 0.389  0.310  0.019  0.308  3.260   0.000  (0.984) 
ROA 457 -0.128  0.366  -2.908  -0.026  0.194    457 -0.018  0.258  -2.365  0.051  0.482   -0.110 *** (0.000) 
Our final sample consists of 914 observations (457 test sample plus 457 matched control sample) over the period from 1993 to 2007.  This table reports summary 
statistics for the variables in our sample, and compares means for the test sample and the matched control sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. *** 





Table 4: Pearson’s Correlations 
 
 
 DA P_DA IPRD S141 SIZE LEV NOA S_GROWTH BTM 
P_DA 0.995                 
IPRD -0.012 -0.020               
S141 0.065 0.080 -0.310             
SIZE -0.004 -0.028 0.123 -0.226           
LEV 0.166 0.168 -0.027 0.037 0.133         
NOA -0.030 -0.031 -0.296 -0.085 0.197 0.135       
S_GROWTH -0.143 -0.013 -0.051 -0.143 0.081 -0.089 0.306     
BTM 0.023 0.032 -0.283 0.315 -0.396 -0.115 0.020 -0.166   
ROA 0.289 0.261 -0.059 -0.180 0.308 0.058 0.118 -0.085 -0.198 
This table reports the Pearson's Correlations in the IPR&D sample. The sample includes 457 observations over the period 1993-2007. All variables are defined in 




Table 5: Changes in Discretionary Accruals for IPR&D Sample and Matched Control Sample for  
Pre- and Post-SFAS 141 and 142 
 
 
 IPR&D Sample Matched Control Sample  IPR&D vs. Matched t-stat   
DA    
Pre-SFAS 141&142 -3.093   0.333 2.40** 
Post-SFAS 141&142 -1.573 -0.335 1.60 
    
P_DA    
Pre-SFAS 141&142 -3.444  0.065 2.50** 
Post-SFAS 141&142 -1.624 -0.396 1.61 




Table 6: Effect of IPR&D Allocation on Earnings Management   
 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 DA  P_DA 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
Intercept 10.998  6.887   10.877  7.084  
 (0.197)  (0.212)   (0.194)  (0.326)  
IPRD -4.046 *** -2.335 **  -4.172 *** -2.664 ** 
 (0.002)  (0.050)   (0.001)  (0.036)  
S141   -2.760 **    -2.496 ** 
   (0.022)     (0.032)  
SIZE   -0.515 *    -0.565 ** 
   (0.076)     (0.052)  
LEV   6.336 **    6.582 ** 
   (0.039)     (0.027)  
NOA   -0.342     -0.381  
   (0.831)     (0.807)  
S_GROWTH   -0.303     -0.036  
   (0.729)     (0.967)  
BTM   0.607     0.672  
   (0.623)     (0.578)  
ROA   9.384 ***    8.391 *** 
   (0.000)     (0.000)  
          
Year Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Two way clusters No  Yes   No  Yes  
Adj. R-Square 2.12%  10.13%   2.20%  8.89%  
No. Obs. 914  914   914  914  
This table presents the multivariate regression analysis to test Hypothesis 1. We estimate the regression models 
using the pooled data over the period of 1993– 2007. The dependent variable for regression (1) and (2) is 
discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones model (DA). The dependent variable of (3) and (4) is 
performance matched discretionary accruals (P_DA). All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively (P-values are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficients).  
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Table 7: Effect of the Adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 on Earnings Management  
 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 DA  P_DA 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
Intercept 8.102  8.482   8.481  8.661  
 (0.276)  (0.164)   (0.245)  (0.275)  
IPRD -6.594 *** -5.460 ***  -6.719 *** -5.734 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)  
S141 -0.974  -4.308 ***  -0.827  -4.017 *** 
 (0.731)  (0.002)   (0.766)  (0.003)  
IPRD×S141 4.478  5.431 **  4.478  5.336 ** 
 (0.112)  (0.024)   (0.105)  (0.035)  
SIZE   -0.523 *    -0.573 ** 
   (0.069)     (0.048)  
LEV   6.078 **    6.329 ** 
   (0.042)     (0.030)  
NOA   -0.351     -0.390  
   (0.827)     (0.802)  
S_GROWTH   -0.339     -0.071  
   (0.697)     (0.935)  
BTM   0.568     0.633  
   (0.650)     (0.605)  
ROA   9.449 ***    8.455 *** 
   (0.000)     (0.000)  
Joint Test          
IPRD + 
IPRD×S141 -2.116  -0.029   -2.241  -0.398  
 (0.252)  (0.987)   (0.217)  (0.827)  
          
Year Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Two way clusters No  Yes   No  Yes  
Adj. R-Square 2.29%  10.44%   2.38%  9.19%  
No. Obs. 914  914   914  914  
This table presents the multivariate regression analysis to test Hypothesis 2. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The dependent variable for regression (1) and (2) is DA. The dependent variable for regression (3) and (4) 
is P_DA. Data are from 1993 to 2007. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. P-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. For joint test, the coefficient is F-
stat for tests of sums of coefficients.  
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Table 8: Effect of IPR&D at the Firm Level on Earnings Management 
 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 DA  P_DA 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
Intercept -1.422  2.946   -1.634  2.946  
 (0.455)  (0.154)   (0.190)  (0.155)  
FIRM_IPRD -0.312 ** -0.232 ***  -0.288 ** -0.232 *** 
 (0.039)  (0.001)   (0.022)  (0.001)  
S141R   -2.394 ***    -2.394 *** 
   (0.001)     (0.001)  
SIZE   -0.534 **    -0.533 *** 
   (0.012)     (0.006)  
LEV   2.294     2.294  
   (0.285)     (0.284)  
NOA   0.350     0.350  
   (0.765)     (0.765)  
S_GROWTH   -1.000 **    -0.999 ** 
   (0.042)     (0.042)  
BTM   -0.620     -0.620  
   (0.615)     (0.307)  
ROA   3.811 ***    3.811 *** 
   (0.001)     (0.001)  
          
Year Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Two way clusters No  Yes   No  Yes  
Adj. R-Square 2.22%  6.31%   2.16%  5.67%  
No. Obs. 1,368  1,368   1,368  1,368  
This table reports the multivariate regression results presented in additional tests. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The dependent variable for regression (1) and (2) is DA. The dependent variable for regression (3) and (4) 
is P_DA. Data are from 1993 to 2011. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and 




Table 9: Effect of the Adoption of SFAS 141R on Earnings Management at the Firm Level 
 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 DA  P_DA 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
Intercept -1.391  2.919   -1.604  2.960 ** 
 (0.466)  (0.182)   (0.387)  (0.015)  
FIRM_IPRD -0.335 ** -0.262 ***  -0.311 ** -0.245 *** 
 (0.035)  (0.001)   (0.039)  (0.001)  
S141R -2.028 * -2.493 ***  -1.950 * -2.404 *** 
 (0.084)  (0.000)   (0.097)  (0.000)  
FIRM_IPRD×S141R 0.365  0.374 **  0.375 * 0.400 ** 
 (0.131)  (0.032)   (0.109)  (0.023)  
SIZE   -0.491 **    -0.535 *** 
   (0.016)     (0.005)  
LEV   2.094     2.304  
   (0.172)     (0.282)  
NOA   0.369     0.354  
   (0.758)     (0.762)  
S_GROWTH   -1.119 **    -1.001 * 
   (0.035)     (0.084)  
BTM   -0.777     -0.635  
   (0.552)     (0.610)  
ROA   4.450 ***    3.805 *** 
   (0.000)     (0.001)  
Joint Test          
FIRM_IPRD + 
FIRM_IPRD×S141R 0.030  0.099   -2.241  0.141  
 (0.972)  (0.541)   (0.217)  (0.377)  
          
Year Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Two way clusters No  Yes   No  Yes  
Adj. R-Square 2.16%  6.34%   2.10%  5.61%  
No. Obs. 1,368  1,368   1,368  1,368  
This table reports the multivariate regression results presented in additional tests. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The dependent variable for regression (1) and (2) is DA. The dependent variable for regression (3) and (4) 
is P_DA. Data are from 1993 to 2011. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. P-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. For joint test, the coefficient is F-
stat for tests of sums of coefficients.  
